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  Option chain and change management : a structural equation application. 
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Abstract: :130 words 
The aim of this work is to establish empirically with a structural equation model (SEM) the 
existence of links between the options perceived by the members of an industry, the expectation 
of future rents produced by the exercise of these options and firm or industry specific factors. The 
theoretical part of this work is based on the notion of option chain developed by Bowman and 
Hurry (1993). The empirical part is on the video-game industry. A questionnaire based dataset on 
211 video-game creators allows us to represent the concepts of potential and real option from a 
strategic point of view. The study shows that the relations between perceived opportunities, 
capacities building and rent expectations are shared by the members of this industry and can be 
expressed as options. 
Key words: Real options, Innovation and change management, structural equation analysis, 
video-game industry.
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Introduction
The success of a firm depends on her ability to earn increasing returns or obtain rents by creating 
and exploiting new projects, routines and technologies in a more efficient way than the other 
firms in the industry (Teece et al., 1997). Those projects are competitive opportunities that the 
firms must recognize, evaluate, and for which they must build operating capabilities to take 
advantage of them. The general management responsible for the firm’s strategic direction fails 
frequently to manage the organization’s technological innovation and change processes that 
create these opportunities (Adner and Levinthal, 2004a). 
To help managers in their decision-making process in uncertain environments new techniques 
and theories are developed, one of them is the real option theory. This conceptual decision 
making framework is about to become a standard (McGrath et al., 2004). The formal approach, 
originating with financial models, dealing with future uncertainty and the opportunities a firm can 
seize, is appealing for managers. 
Bowman and Hurry (1993) present a conceptual model, called option chain (the successive steps 
of creation, development and use of a real option) aimed to bring the real option logic from the 
financial field to the strategic management field. Their work was based on the intuition that 
people try to keep options open. The authors showed that the option chain could be seen as an 
analysis framework integrating many aspects of innovation management (resource allocation, 
sense making, organizational learning and strategic positioning) and that their model could be 
useful to explain many aspects of the development of a firm, from both a theoretical and an 
empirical point of view. 
The real option logic gains a broad success in financial and managerial literature but the concept 
of option chain is comparatively very infrequently used in theoretical work and to our knowledge 2
no empirical work tries to represent it explicitly. This is regretful because the elimination of the 
causal logic behind the option chain pushes the managerial approach of real option into some 
wrong roads, considering situations as options when there are not ( Garud et al., 1998; Adner and 
Levinthal, 2004a,b; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2004). Also, the partial consideration of the option 
chain, focusing only on the real option element, makes the financial approach still predominant 
and avoids many non-financial topics of innovation management that are important from a 
strategic point of view such as organizational learning or firm strategy–structure relations. 
In this work we use the option chain to answer a major issue, almost ignored in this literature,  
the question of the origin of the real options a firm possesses from a theoretical point of view and 
we propose a possible empirical approach. 
We suggest the use of the entrepreneur/manager duality for explaining the creation of new 
options. This duality, often described by opposing two actors with different mind sets, 
responsibilities and abilities,  can be found in many firms active in industry where constant 
innovation is a necessity.  
The insights gained from considering real option and the entrepreneur/manager duality are bi-
directional. On the one hand entrepreneurship, in a resource based framework, can explain the 
origin of real option and contribute to a better evaluation of its value. On the other hand real 
option can explain the direction a decision maker gives to the development of the new 
capabilities and resources, as an entrepreneurial activity, by suggesting another use of the 
resources. Combining entrepreneurship and real option explains the heterogeneity of the firm and 
its resources collection and capabilities building.  
The empirical approach we propose is based on a structural equation model allowing us to create 
latent variables close to the notions used in the option chain and to test the relationships (the 3
paths) existing between those variables along the chain. Our endeavour is to make a structure 
apparent between the different kinds of options. To that end, structural equation modelling 
(SEM) is an appropriate tool (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007:30). The use of this tool in strategic 
management has strongly increased in recent years and, following Shook et al. (2004), is able to 
generate insights in the strategic management where the constructs are complex and 
multidimensional. This exploratory study is carried out on innovative firms from the video-game 
industry. 
In the next section we present the theoretical background: the option chain. This is done by 
introducing the original model by Bowman and Hurry (1993) and the incremental developments 
and improvements that have been made since, including the addition of our entrepreneur/manager 
duality. The section ends with the proposal of a conceptual model of the genesis of option and 
new product development. Subsequent sections transform this conceptual model into a structural 
equation model, present the data, the empirical analysis and the results. The paper concludes by 
discussing the findings and their implications for future research.  
Theoretical Background 
An option gives the right but not the obligation to take a specific decision (invest, defer, alter) on 
an underlying asset, for a predetermined price at, or before, a certain time. For example, a firm 
can possess a production plant, and choose, depending on customer demand or competition, to 
construct a bigger capacity plant to obtain economies of scale (a growth option) or, on the 
contrary, to momentarily shut down the plant (option to defer production). The firm has the right, 
but not the obligation, to change her production capacity. This option, depending on the 4
information at hand at the moment of exercise, allows the firm to seize new revenues flows or to 
reduce costs. 
Figure 1 represents the successive developments of the real option chain in the strategic 
management literature. The following discussion and presentation of the option chain and the 
introduction of the entrepreneur / manager duality rely on that figure. 
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
Standard option exploitation 
The area labelled c represents the initial step of the real option theory as it can be found in 
today’s major textbooks on that topic (Trigeorgis, 1996; Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999) and is 
highly influenced by the financial literature. This short option chain is the following: the option is 
supposed to exist, to be available to the decision maker. The decision maker (always referred to 
as the manager in this literature) evaluates the option contingently to the future possible states, 
and decides to exercise it or not.  
To exercise means that the project enters a phase of building and exploitation. Once the firm is in 
an exploitation phase new options can arise such as expanding the size of the plant, diversifying 
the production, or in the worst case, stopping the production and shutting down the factory. 
Identification of opportunities, the emergence of the potential option 
The previous representation, as noticed by academics in the strategic management field, makes 
the important assumption that the option exists and that the decision maker is informed of its 
existence. This is, obviously, not always the case. Bowman and Hurry (1993) struck by that 
implicit hypothesis, introduced the notion of shadow option (or potential option in the following), 5
the option that a firm could exploit, or at least consider in her portfolio of choices but of which 
she is not aware. In other words the authors intuition is that the firm possesses resources and 
knowledge giving her options that the decision makers ignore. 
Opportunities (and not yet options) come into existence when individuals have different beliefs in 
the possibilities offered by the available or potential resources to transform some inputs into 
some outputs that can be sold and raise a profit (Kirzner, 1979). An opportunity is a favourable, 
momentary circumstance or situation that has been recognized after one has sought it or that has 
spontaneously appeared. Once the potential option is taken into account (area d Figure 1) the 
rest of the option chain can be considered in the same way as described above. When the shadow 
option is recognized, it moves from the potential option label to the real option label. The option 
has then to be evaluated, compared to the other options, by taking into account the probable 
interaction between the different options the firm possesses in her portfolio of choice.  
The addition made by Bowman and Hurry (1993) does not completely answer the question of the 
origin of the real option, it merely shifts the debate. Instead of explaining the origin of the real 
option, the genesis of the potential option must be elucidated. 
Introduction of the entrepreneur / manager duality  
A historical approach of entrepreneurs in the microeconomic theory (Barreto, 1989) shows that 
when authors need to introduce novelties or special variations into a theory of the firm they often 
refer to the figure of the entrepreneur. In this work we consider entrepreneurship as a resource of 
the firm making it possible to discover opportunities (Cohendet et al., 2000). Kirzner introduced 
the concept of “entrepreneurial alertness” as the special ability of the entrepreneur to see where 
products (or services) do not exist and can be profitably exploited. Alertness exists when one 6
individual (or a group in the case of diffused entrepreneurship) has an insight into the value of a 
given resource while others do not.
Once the opportunity is identified e one can notice that the entrepreneur certainly does not have 
the specific knowledge and expertise in all domains necessary to fulfil his goal. This leaves him 
in charge of finding and combining the adequate resources for building new productive 
competences. This building process is not instantaneous, it is mainly path dependent and involves 
tacit knowledge acquired through learning by doing and experimentation (Kogut and Zander, 
1992). This implies that firms who create knowledge are also option-creating firms. By creating 
new knowledge these firms expand their cognitive frames and therefore their real options. To 
explain that phenomenon McGrath and Boisot (2005) use a biological metaphor. The 
combination of different elements (like genes in biology) allows the firm to obtain a variety of 
different structures depending on the complexity of the possible combinations. The higher the 
degree of freedom of the combinations, the broader the variety of potential outcomes. This degree 
of freedom in the combinations corresponds to the liberty the entrepreneurs take in their 
representations. This specific entrepreneurial mindset is a source of potential options. The value 
of the entrepreneurial resource derives here from his ability to combine different expert 
knowledge in such a way as to create and exploit opportunities. The conceptual liberty of the 
entrepreneur is a source of options, however this liberty has to match the flexibility of the firm. 
The complex recombination of elements envisaged by the entrepreneur must be put into practice 
by the firm, to this end the complexity of the firm must at least match the complexity envisaged 
by the entrepreneur to satisfy Ashby’s law (Ashby, 1956). 
The decision to exercise the option and to turn to a production phase corresponds to a managerial 
decision making process. A reason why the manager does not enter the option chain earlier 7
comes from the nature of the output of the shadow option. The output of the knowledge building 
process (what is done during the shadow option) is difficult to evaluate, the knowledge is 
disperse and the manager is not aware of all pieces before the entrepreneur ends his action. 
Following March (1991), we could say that in the option chain, the entrepreneur is in charge of 
the explorative learning of the firm and the manager of the exploitative learning. The managerial 
decision depends on the balance between entering the market with the actual resources and 
knowledge or waiting for absorbing more capacities.  
Empirical model development and hypotheses 
Building on the notions and the conceptual model presented previously we draw a path model 
capturing the relations and the logic behind the option chain. This model incorporates the 
following effects: (i) industry and (ii) firm specific effects on potential option generation, those 
constitute the necessary condition for novelty, (iii) industry and (iv) firm specific effects on the 
development and exercise of the potential option into a real option, and (v) the expected influence 
of those options on the future rent of the firm. 
The relations between industry and firm specific features on potential option creation 
The effects of market and technological uncertainty on firm decision have received abundant 
attention over the years. In particular the relation between uncertainty and development of 
options and new competences has been developed. The relation between uncertainty and the 
elements of the firm is particularly discussed when the firm has to act in such an environment. 
The choices available to her are to stick to the existing few competences or to develop her 
portfolio of competences widely, which has implications from an organizational point of view 
and on the risk profile of the firm. 8
Following the option literature, the greater the technological uncertainty, the more flexible the 
firm needs to be (Kogut, 1991, Folta, 1998). On the contrary when the uncertainty is relatively 
low, resources can be widely engaged in a few precise projects (McGrath, 2000). 
Hypothesis 1a: The higher the innovativeness of the industry, the greater the creation of potential 
options. 
Hypothesis 1b: The higher the innovativeness of firm employees, the greater the creation of 
potential options. 
The relations between potential options and real options 
The passage from a potential to a real option involves a managerial decision of allocation of 
resources to the development of a project. This requires to value the flexibility of the firm, and 
implies acquiring, retaining, deploying or abandoning some knowledge inventories and views 
developed by a part of the firm.  
Levinthal and March (1993) described the knowledge inventory of a firm as “a small number of 
specialized competencies maintained by the individuals and groups that make up the 
organization” (p.103). Managing knowledge inventories is problematic because “where situations 
or proper responses are numerous and shifting, it is harder to specify and realize optimal 
inventories of knowledge. By the time knowledge is needed, it is too late to gain it; before 
knowledge is needed, it is hard to specify precisely what knowledge might be required or useful. 
It is necessary to create inventories of competencies that might be used later without knowing 
precisely what future demands will be” (p. 103). This management problem is the source of 
myopias and decision biases. McGrath (1999) surveyed many of those myopias and decision 
biases that can be confronted by a manager or entrepreneur hindering the development of 9
potentials into real capabilities or, in that case, real options. Miller (2002) proposes a model for 
assessing the difficulties of the managers to overcome these biases when allocating resources in a 
knowledge based framework. Also Miller and Shapira (2003), in an experimental economic 
framework, show that the evaluation of opportunities, when they are presented in the form of 
options, is in practice difficult and does not always follow the direction and/or magnitude 
predicted by theory. 
All those authors show that describing the link between the potential and the real option is 
difficult. However in a study of more than 300 projects, McGrath and Dubini (1999) show that 
the perception of option potential is a powerful driver of resource commitment and has 
implications for the organizational design. Accordingly we can say that the development of 
potential options fosters the existence of real options. 
Hypothesis 2: The perceived potential of an option will increase the likelihood of it being 
developed as a real option. 
The relations between industry and firm specific features on the exercise of a real option 
Amit and Schoemaker (1993) introduced the notion of strategic industry factors: the set of 
resources and capabilities that have become primarily determinant for the survival and 
development of the firms in a defined industry. These generic strategic assets are completed in 
each firm by firm specific strategic assets, referring to the resources and capabilities developed 
by a single firm for obtaining and protecting rents. In the light of these definitions, the strategic 
position of a firm evolves each time she –or a competitor– develops new resources or capabilities 
leading to a firm specific strategic asset. In the case of a major development in an industry those 10 
strategic industry factors can change considerably, creating the need for all the firms to develop 
new resources.   
Following the previous discussion two hypotheses on the real option exercise can be formulated, 
in relation to the determinant of the industry strategic assets, and to the firm specific competences 
and resources. 
Hypothesis 3a: The perceived threat of competitors is positively related with the exercise of real 
options. 
Hypothesis 3b: The uniqueness of the competences developed is positively related with the 
exercise of real options. 
The relations between potential options, real options and firm performances 
The links between future rent and project development are explored theoretically and empirically 
in some studies, even if it is not always in a clear option formulation. Makadok (2001) presents a 
rent generation model where the firm can choose between building her own resources or picking 
up existing resources on the market. While the creation of resources corresponds entirely to our 
option chain and leads to rents, the picking up of resources corresponds more to a catching up 
strategy leading to a small advantage that is only possible when there are other firms in the 
industry who have built and stored those resources. Hence one could wonder if the fact the 
competitors have those resources is not a brake upon a superior profitability of the firm and 
whether those two resource acquiring techniques are not substitutes or complements, enhancing 
or detracting each other value. In an empirical work McGrath et al. (1996) identify drivers of 
future rents from innovation. Among these drivers are the understanding by the teams of the 
client satisfaction objectives, quality objectives, cost objectives, proficiency and the expectation 11 
of distinctive efficiency and value from the firm corresponding to the increase in value that 
customers will obtain from the firm rather than by products from competitors. 
From these observations we formulate the following hypotheses linking real option, potential 
option and firm performance. 
Hypothesis 4a: Expected Firm performance depends positively on the development of real 
options. 
Hypothesis 4b: Expected Firm performance depends negatively on the perceived threat of 
competitors. 




The study consists of a survey conducted on 211 employees of different video-game companies 
based in Europe, Asia, U.S.A. and Canada. The survey is completed by employees from firms of 
different sizes. All the respondents were active in that industry by the time of the survey and 
participated in the development of new products. The product can be either the final product (the 
video-game) sold to the consumer, or a computer program needed for the development of a new 
game. This program can be developed for in-house utilization by another project group of the 
same firm or sold to another company.  
The data are second hand, they were collected by a game developer survey conducted through 
internet (see Tschang, 2005, for details on the dataset building method) and was not conceived 
for testing the option chain but for evaluating the work conditions of the employees in that 12 
industry and their communication with the management. The data do not allow us to know the 
level of responsibility of the respondents (manager or another member of a project team) nor the 
activities of the respondents (programmer, artistic, design or integration activity…).  
But the survey is composed of many questions concerning the development of the firm, her 
evolution compared to competitors, and the sharing of opinions between management and 
employees that allow us to created latent variables corresponding to our needs. 
Cadin  et al. (2006) conducted a study on the HRM practices in the video-game business 
investigating industry and firm specificities. They consider the differences in the function of 
human resources, the employment model and the growth model of the firms and conclude that the 
video-game firms needs (as organizations) and practices are the same in the U.S. and in the E.U. 
The HRM practice and the organizational scheme are contingent to the industry not to the 
country. Hence the variance introduced by the variety of the respondents belonging to firms of 
different sizes should be moderate and we can use our country heterogeneous data set in the 
following study.   
On the other hand, it is probable that the size of the firm influences the employee rewards and 
career management possibilities and thereby affects the risk-taking behaviour and willingness to 
create more innovative products (a less conventional product can be seen as a riskier product). 
However all firms in this specific industry share the necessity to innovate, therefore this size 
effect should be of modest relevance. 
Apart from these points there are other reasons why we choose the video-game industry for this 
exploratory study of the option chain. To ease our work, it is more likely to find a good 13 
representation of the option chain in an industry where the pace of new product launching is high 
and where the firm has to constantly reposition herself in a quickly evolving environment. In that 
case the set of internal competences and resources is dependent on and concurrent to those of the 
competitors. This is the case in this business as reported by Cadin et al. (2006:296)  : “Everything 
in the game industry is based on confidentiality and anticipation (…) it is essential to stay in the 
race (…) it is more difficult to keep up to date with new technologies, competitors projects and 
trends”. 
The dynamics of the industry is to a great extent imposed by the evolution of the underlying 
technology. The development of new computers and consoles every five to six years offers the 
video-game engineers new calculation power allowing them to conceive enhanced products but 
also confronts them with higher expectations from the customers (Burgerlman et al., 2005; 
Schilling, 2003). This environment eases the adoption of a product development process in the 
form of an option chain. 
Item development
The items in the questionnaire submitted to the employees are answered by giving a score on a 1 
to 5 Likert type scale, where a higher score is associated with a higher approval of the item. Two 
choices are open to us for linking the different questions to the latent variables. We can use a 
factor analysis and use the aggregated factor obtained to calculate the correlation matrix for the 
SEM analysis on the latent variables, or we can use a larger correlation matrix where all the items 
appear. As our main concern is to establish the simple link between potential and real options we 
use the first approach. This has another advantage, the distribution for each latent variable is 
closer to a normal distribution when we work on the aggregate latent variables and thus gives 
better overall results for the model estimation. The reliability of the construct obtained by 14 
grouping the items of the questionnaire is assessed with Cronbach’s alpha. The alpha for each 
construct is above or close to the 0.7 recommended level (Hair et al., 2005), details are given in 
Table 1. 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for each of the latent variables are provided in 
Table 2. Figure 2 illustrates the relations between the construct involved in the option chain 
previously discussed.  
The variables are not skewed except for those concerning the firm competences and 
innovativeness that are slightly skewed to the right (5 points). This can mean that people are 
optimistic in their own work, and see the development of new products necessary.  It can also 
partly be the expression of over confidence (McGrath, 1999). 
It should also be noted that the standard deviation of the industry innovativeness variable is about 
the same as the industry threats variable, the same can be said between firm innovativeness and 
firm threat variables. The standard deviation is higher in the variables in accordance with the 
competitor’s reaction (industry related variables) than for the firm variables corresponding to a 
shared opinion in the firms. The relations in Table 2 are compatible with the path relation of our 
structural model and the underlying hypothesis we formulated. 
--- Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 about here --- 15 
Both industry innovativeness and firm innovativeness are positively correlated with potential 
options indicating that an innovative environment fosters the creation of options. Rent 
expectation is positively correlated with the firm competences and the different types of options 
but negatively with the industry variables. In the option chain, the highest correlation is between 
potential option and real option indicating a strong relation between these constructs. The highest 
correlation among all the parameters is between industry threats and firm competences. This 
somewhat troubling positive relation suggests that the competitors know each other very well and 
that the competition results in a positive emulation, we discuss this in a community perspective in 
the conclusion.  
Structural analysis 
We employ Amos 4.0 to develop a structural model that tests the relations proposed and some 
alternative path models employing the same constructs with different paths or leaving out some 
of the constructs and paths. 
The main model we tested obtained a Ȥ
2 value of 11.59 with 13 degrees of freedom and p-value 
of 0.562. This means that the null hypothesis (the model fits the data) cannot be rejected. The 
results are listed in Table 2, alternative measures of fit are given in Table 3. All paths are 
significant, the fit indicators are on average acceptable. 
--- Insert Table 3 and 4 about here --- 
As expected the analysis shows that potential options are highly associated with real options and 
that both industry and firm innovativeness affect the potential options. So far the hypotheses H1a, 
H1b and H2 cannot be rejected, although the influence of the industry innovativeness is small 16 
compared to the firm effects. The option chain continues through hypothesis H4a where real 
option affects the rent expectation. The representation of the option chain is therefore achieved. 
We can notice that industry threats affect negatively the rent expectation and the real option 
creation, suggesting that when the competition is tough firms focus on some projects reducing 
their real options.   
The statistical analysis we perform implies that the data fit the model, but this does not mean that 
no other models exist that have a similar or perhaps better fit. Then, understandably, we consider 
alternative models.  
Alternatives models  
The alternative models we test correspond to the dismissal or addition of different paths. The 
main alternative models tested are listed in Table 5. The dismissal of one path leads generally to a 
shrinking of the p-value and to the rejection of the model (e.g. model 2). The model general fit is 
only slightly modified when the hypotheses H3a and H3b affecting the real option variable are 
dropped. Permutation between H3a,b and H4a,b paths shows that the model needs a link between 
industry threats and firms competences with either the real option or rent expectation variable but 
there is no clear preference which one should be taken. Also a correlation path between industry 
innovativeness and firm innovativeness leads to a minimal improvement of the model. This is 
somehow surprising when we consider this industry as innovation oriented.   
--- Insert Table 5 about here --- 17 
The addition of a path between rent expectation and potential option does not lead to an 
improvement of the model (model 4). Therefore the recursive part of the option chain, mentioned 
in the work of Bowman and Hurry (1993), is not empirically represented with these data.  
The model with the best fit, built with paths in accordance with our framework, is obtained by 
adding a path between firm innovativeness and firm competences and concentrating the relations 
on the real option variable. This result echoes the dynamic capabilities approach of the firm, 
where the capacity of a firm to innovate is considered as a competence.  
From this analysis, we see that our initial model gives fair results compared to alternative models, 
only a few are acceptable in the same range as our model and hardly any fits better the data than 
our representation. We now turn to the discussion of these results. 
Discussion 
In this work we developed the conceptual option chain scheme proposed by Bowman and Hurry 
(1993). We show an empirical approach of that concept by developing a structural equation 
model. The results we found support those of other authors linking the fields of innovation 
management and investment decision (Van de Ven, 1986; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; McGrath 
and Dubini, 1999; Tushman and Andersen, 2004; Cho and Pucik, 2006) and suggest some new 
paths for future research.  
We found that the members of an organization recognize that the differences between their own 
competences and those of the competitors are the source of rents or profits obtained by catching 
the consumer’s demand. The employees of the firms account simultaneously for the demand pull 
and technology push implication of product development. The differential in resources and 
competences existing between a firm and the industry is the origin of the rent expectation which 
is in line with the arguments of the resource based view of the firm. The historically dependent 18 
accumulation of resources and the idiosyncratic routines developed are at the source of the higher 
performance of firms and influence their capacity to change dynamically (for a broad survey of 
these questions Foss, 1997; and a more management oriented perspective in Pfeffer and Salancik, 
2003). 
To conclude, we discus two elements of this work, the future development of the option chain 
and the implication of the video-game industry data we used. 
The option chain with other critical issues in strategy   
Brown and Eisenhardt (1995:374) note that the creative processes where the competences of the 
firm are “matched” with the market needs in such a way as to create new products should be 
explored. In particular the firm governance mechanism between top management and project 
management for evaluating, creating and exploiting synergies between competences in the firm 
are to be investigated in the light of the real option theory. Recent developments in organization 
theory and theory of the firm see this in the rebirth of the old duality between entrepreneurs and 
managers. The economic distinction between an entrepreneur as an innovator as opposed to a 
manager responsible for the administrative tasks is no more sufficient. Both of them have to 
answer problems of sense making, diffused entrepreneurship, networked organization and 
entrepreneurial and managerial life cycles among others. These domains influence the way a firm 
develops her strategy and impacts directly on the option chain that appears here too linear. We 
can advocate that it could be difficult to empirically test a more complex option creation and 
utilization model, but this remains a possible future path of research. 
An important issue, not mentioned in that work, is that of the type of rent created. Options on 
new technologies can produce Schumpeterian rents, options on trademarks or licenses allow the 
firm to seize monopoly rents. Accordingly, the specificity of an option developed by the firm 19 
allows her to seize a specific type of rent and therefore some option chains are more valuable for 
the firm than others. In that sense, the option chain approach could be another way of defining 
dynamic capabilities. A firm with good dynamic capabilities is a firm who is able to move faster 
or more slower on some options chains and can link them together for achieving unique 
resources. We line up here with the approach of Mathews (2003) who characterizes the firm 
strategic moves by expanding their real options via external resources acquisition. In this work he 
lists the advantages and disadvantages (even feasibility) of internal and external development of 
real options. As we do in our work he insists on the option chain structure and the simultaneous 
consideration of the industry and firm innovativeness and threats. But both works do not tackle 
the dynamic capabilities and rent generating mechanism with the option chain, leaving it open for 
further research.  
The limits due to the video-game industry data used 
The video-game industry and the underlying problematic of new product development in an 
evolving industry fit perfectly the purpose of the option chain. However the data used in this 
study were collected during a particular period of the video-game industry corresponding to a 
certain level of uncertainty that could have an impact on the results. Data came from the period 
before the launch of new platforms, when firms had to reinvent the electronic entertainment. 
Schilling (2003) studied such a period of technological and business uncertainties during a plate-
form change. She concluded that the firms are obsessed by the technology gap and their capacity 
of using the full potentiality of the calculation capacity of the platform. Therefore the importance 
given to uncertainty and innovativeness in the empirical findings can be somehow overestimated. 20 
The other problem specific to this industry is that the firms are organized –deliberately  or not–  
in communities. Therefore the opinions and practices are largely shared industry-wide. 
Dougherty (2001) analyzed the innovation procedure of several firms and showed that there are 
significant differences between the firms successful in their innovation process and the others. 
The central reason comes, for this author, from the project orientation of the different teams, and 
the integration of the outputs from the different teams. The successful innovators are those who 
dispatch the problems in different workgroups corresponding to the competences of the 
individuals and to their competitive advantage. The individuals see themselves as belonging to 
communities of practice with a specific task or problem to solve. The individuals of those firms 
understand that the value created by establishing and developing a long term relation with the 
customer on the basis of their innovative products is important. In addition to the community 
perspective, the organizational structures of the firms in the video-game industry are almost 
similar, consequently the opinions and expectations of small working groups are largely the 
same. Only major strategic moves, corresponding to major investments for the firms can make 
significant differences in the types of products developed. This is not captured at employee level, 
but rather at the decision level which is not taken into account in that study.  
Related to this is the control of the specific organization of work flows in the video-game 
industry (and other innovation oriented industries) that relies critically on some individuals who 
act as sense makers. Simon (2006) shows on case studies of a large video-game company that the 
existence of shared meaning of the project and the interrelation of the different projects within the 
firm and its co-evolution with the practice of the industry is a key factor of success. This 
integration capacity is not clearly mentioned in our dataset and deserves attention in future work. 21 
Finally, the further development of the real option construct in the strategic management should 
try to replicate this approach in other industries. As suggested by authors in strategic 
management (Barnett, 2003) and finance (Zingales, 2000) the next step should be the 
identification of the main elements of the theory of the firm that could be utilized to represent 
adequately the option chain concept in a framework better suited for strategic management 
analysis than the traditional Black-Scholes financial approach.   22 
References 
Adner, Ron and Daniel Levinthal, 2004a, “What is not real option: Identifying boundaries for 
the application of real options to business strategy”. Academy of Management Review, 29:74-85. 
Adner, Ron and Daniel Levinthal, 2004b, “Real options and real tradeoffs”. Academy of 
Management Review, 29:120-126. 
Amit, Raphael and Paul Schoemaker, 1993, “Strategic assets and organizational rent”. 
Strategic Management Journal, 14:33-46. 
Amram, Martha and Nalin Kulatilaka, 1999, Real options: Managing strategic investment in 
an uncertain world. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ashby, William, 1956, An introduction to cybernetics., London: Chapman and Hall.
Barnett, Michael, 2003, “Falling off the fence? A realistic appraisal of a real options approach to 
corporate strategy”. Journal of management inquiry, 12:185-196. 
Barreto, Humberto, 1989, The entrepreneur in microeconomic theory: Disappearance and 
explanation. New york: Routledge Kegan & Paul. 
Bowman, Edward and Dileep Hurry, 1993, “Strategy through the option lens: An integrated 
view of resource investment and the incremental-choice process”. Academy of Management 
Review, 18: 760-782. 
Brown, Shona and Kathleen Eisenhardt, 1995, “Product development: past research, present 
findings, and future directions”. Academy of Management Review, 20:343-378. 
Burgelman Robert, Andrew Grove and Philip Meza, 2005, Strategic dynamics: Concepts and 
Cases., New York: McGrawHill/Irwin. 
Cadin, Loïc, Francis Guérin and Robert Defillippi, 2006, “HRM Practice in the video-game 
industry: industry or country contingent?”. European Management Journal, 24:288-298. 
Cho, Hee-Jae and Vladimir Pucik, 2005, “Relationship between innovativeness, quality, 
growth, profitability, and market value”. Strategic Management Journal, 26:555-575.  
Cohendet, Patrick, Patrick Llerena and Luigi Marengo, 2000, “Is there a pilot in the 
evolutionary theory of the Firm?”. In N. Foss, V. Mahnke (eds.) Competence, governance and 
entrepreneurship. New York: Oxford University Press, pp.95-115. 
Dougherty, Deborah, 2001, “Reimagining the differentiation and integration of work for 
sustained product innovation”. Organization Science, 12:612-631. 
Folta, Timothy, 1998, “Governance and uncertainty: The tradeoff between administrative 
control and commitment”. Strategic Management Journal, 19:1007-1022. 23 
Foss, Nicolai, 1997, Resources, Firms, and Strategies: A Reader in the Resource-Based 
Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Garud, Raghu, Arun Kumaraswamy and Praveen Nayyar, 1998, “Real options or fool’s 
gold? Perspectives makes the difference”. Academy of Management Review, 23:212-214. 
Hair Joseph, Bill Black, Barry Babin, Rolph Anderson and Ronald Tatham, 2005,
Multivariate Data Analysis, 6
th edition., New York: Prentice Hall. 
Kirzner, Israel, 1979,  Perception, Opportunity and Profit., Chicago: University Press of 
Chicago. 
Kogut, Bruce, 1991, “Joint ventures and the option to expand and acquire”. Management 
Science, 37:19-33. 
Kogut, Bruce and Nalin Kulatilaka, 2004, “Real options pricing and organizations: The 
contingent risks of extended  theoretical domains”. Academy of Management Review, 29:102-110 
Kogut, Bruce and Udo Zander, 1992, “Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and 
the replication of technology”. Organization Science, 3: 383–397. 
Levinthal, Daniel and James March,1993, “The myopia of learning”. Strategic Management 
Journal, 14: 95-112. 
Makadok, Richard, 2001, “Toward a synthesis of the resource-based and dynamic-capability 
view of rent creation”. Strategic Management Review, 22:387-401. 
March, James, 1991, “Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning”. Organization 
Science, 2:71-87. 
Mathews, John, 2003, “Strategizing by firms in the presence of markets for resources”. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 12:1157-1193. 
McGrath, Rita, 1999, “Falling forward: real options reasoning and entrepreneurial failure”. 
Academy of Management Review, 24: 13–30. 
McGrath, Rita, 2000, “Assessing technology projects using real options reasoning”. Research 
Technology Management, 43:35-50. 
McGrath, Rita and Max Boisot, 2005, “Options complexes: going beyond real options 
reasoning”. E:CO, 7:2-13. 
McGrath, Rita and Paola Dubini, 1999, “Salient options: Strategic resource allocation under 
uncertainty”. In M. Hitt, P. Clifford, R. Nixon and K. Coyne (eds.) Dynamic strategic resources: 
Development, diffusion and integration. New York: John Wiley and Sons, pp. 347-372. 24 
McGrath, Rita, Walter Ferrier and Aubrey Mendelow, 2004, “Real options as engines of 
choice and heterogeneity”. Academy of Management Review, 29:86-101. 
McGrath, Rita, Ming-Hone Tsai, S. Venkataraman and Ian MacMillan, 1996, “Innovation, 
competitive advantage and rent: A model and test”. Management Science, 42:389-403. 
Miller, Kent, 2002, “Knowledge inventories and managerial myopia”. Strategic Management 
Journal, 23: 689–706. 
Miller, Kent and Zur Shapira, 2004, “An empirical test of heuristics and biases affecting real 
option valuation”, Strategic Management Journal, 25:269-284. 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Gerald Salancik, 2003, The External Control of Organizations: A 
Resource Dependence Perspective. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Schilling, Melissa, 2003, ‘Technological leapfrogging: lessons from the u.s. video-game console 
industry”. California Management Review, 45:6-32. 
Shook, Christopher, David Ketchen, Thomas Hult and Michele Kacmar, 2004, “An 
assessment of the use of structural equation modeling in strategic management research”. 
Strategic Management Journal, 25:397-404. 
Simon, Laurent, 2006, “Managing creative projects: An empirical synthesis of activities”. 
International Journal of Project Management, 24:116-126. 
Tabachnick, Barbara and Linda Fidell, 2007, Using Multivariate Statistics., New York: 
Pearson Education. 
Teece, David, Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen, 1997, “Dynamic capabilities and strategic 
management”. Strategic Management Journal, 18: 509-533. 
Trigeorgis, Lenos, 1996, Real Options: Managerial Flexibility and Strategy in Resource 
Allocation. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Tschang, Ted, 2005, “Videogames as interactive experiential products and their manner of 
development.”, International Journal of Innovative Management, 9: 1-29. 
Tushman, Michael and Philip Anderson, 2004, Managing strategic innovation and change: A 
collection of readings., New York: Oxford University Press. 
Van de Ven, Andrew, 1986, “Central problems in the management of innovation”. Management 
Science, 32:590-607. 
Zingales, Luigi, 2000, “In search of new foundations”. The Journal of Finance, 4: 1623-1653. 25 



















Option  26 























Table 1 Latent variable definition: The following questions have been used for creating the latent 
variables (1-not at all, 3- to some extend, 5- to a very large extend) 
Latent variable  Items: 
Industry
Innovativeness 
- Other companies in the industry launch more innovative products than 
your company 
- Other companies in the industry produce a larger variety of products 
(RPG, FPS…) than your company  
- Other companies in the industry produce for a larger variety of platforms 
(computer, console) than your company  
Cronbach Alpha: 0.78 
Firm
Innovativeness 
- Most of the products development in your company are new, based on 
new ideas and/or new practices 
- Your company commits many employee to the development of new 
technologies/processes  
- Your company commits many physical, financial, organizational and 
logistical resources to the development of new technologies/processes 
- Your company innovates more than the majority of the firms in this 
industry 
- Your company places strong emphasis on R&D, technological 
leadership, and innovation 
- Your company tries to create small, autonomous units to encourage 




- The business practices, corporate culture and management style of your 
company gives you a lot of free decision possibilities  
- Your company is flexible according to her equipment and resources 
- Your company is flexible according to her human resource management 
practices and routines 
- Your company develops an exhaustive set of alternatives before making 
important management decisions 
- The project you are involved in will help the company to learn new 
manufacturing, production or operations skills 
- The project you are involved in will help the company to learn about new 
market segments and market opportunities 
- The project you are involved in will help the company to learn what 
product features and attributes our customers really care about
Cronbach Alpha: 0.8128 
Real Option  - To use this technology/process your company had to invest significantly 
in specialized equipment and facilities 
- To use this technology/process your company had to invest significantly 
in skilled human resources 
- The technology/process your company develops or uses now is based on 
previous investment in equipment  
- The technology/process your company develops or uses now is based on 
previous investment in human resources 
- When your company sees business opportunities, she can seize them 
quicker than her competitors 
Cronbach Alpha: 0.74 
Industry 
Threats  
- It is difficult for competitors to imitate the product/technologies/process 
your company uses (scale inversed for the latent variable construction) 
- How do you rate your company ability to evaluate the market 
development of next generation game/console (scale inversed for the 
latent variable construction) 
- Your company believes that unstable, rapidly changing environments 
provide more opportunities than threats (scale inversed for the latent 
variable construction) 
Cronbach Alpha: 0.69 
Firm
Competences 
- The technological risks (that the systems would not work as planned) of 
the projects your are involved in are usually mastered  
- The organizational risks (that the systems would not integrated with 
others, or are not reusable) of the projects your are involved are usually 
mastered  
- The financial resources are adequately dispatched between different 
projects  
- The human resources are adequately dispatched between different 
projects 
- People in your company accept change readily  
Cronbach Alpha: 0.74 
Rent – Profit  
Expectation 
- With this project your company will achieve higher profit than 
competitors 
- As a result of this project, customers will be willing to pay a premium 
price for our offers 
- This project is likely to significantly improve the quality of our offers 
compared to past quality levels 
Cronbach Alpha: 0.81 29 
Table 2 Latent variables descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 














Ind.  Innov.  2,59  0,92       
Firm.  Innov. 3,08  0,59  0,08      
P.  Option    3,78  0,49  0,24  0,08     
R.  Option  3,17  0,38 0,04 0,28 0,38       
Ind.  Threats    3,53  0,89 0,17  -0,14 0,32 0,12     
Firm.  Comp.  3,3  0,57 0,09 0,11 0,27 0,29 0,41   
Rent  Expect.  3,37  0,64  -0,11 0,29 0,44 0,28  -0,23 0,38 30 
Table 3 Structural Model results,  N= 211, Ȥ
2=11.59, Probability level = 0.562 
Path   Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation 
Standard Error 
Industry innov. to potential option (H1a)   0.066  0.14 
Firm innov. to potential option (H1b)   0.357  0.25 
Potential option to real option (H2)   0.344  0.18 
Industry threats to real option (H3a)  -0.087  0.12 
Firm competences to real option (H3b)   0.430  0.29 
Real option to rent expectation (H4a)   0.285  0.22 
Industry threat to rent Expectation (H4b)  -0.241  0.13 
Firm competences to rent expectation (H4c)   0.511  0.33 31 
Table 4 Goodness of fit for the measurement model  
  Initial Model   Best Revised Model   Desired Levels 
Ȥ
2 11.59  7.069  Smaller 
Df 13  10  - 
Ȥ
2 / Df  0.89  0.7069  <3.0 
p-value 0.562  0.719  >  0.05 
GFI 0.878  0.918  >  0.9 
AGFI 0.738  0.769  >  0.8 
Standardized RMR  0.049  0.035  < 0.05 32 
Table 5 Test of alternative models 
Model  Path differences with initial model   Ȥ
2 P-value 
1  Initial model + Industry Innovativeness Î Firm Innovativeness  10.40  0.58 
2  Initial model without H4b and H4c   13.91  0.45 
3  Initial model without H3a and H3b  12.33  0.58 
4  Initial model + Rent Expectation Î Option Potential  11.55  0.48 
5  Initial model + Firm Innovativeness Î Firm Competence 
Industry innovativeness Î Real Option 
Firm Innovativeness Î Real Option 
Without H4b and H4c 
7.06 0.71 1 
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